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#181
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Hey Lee, that 77-23 vote came after the white house lied about Saddam having WMD's.
Note: We still haven't caught Osama Bin Laden and he's the sob that blew up our towers that started this whole mess.
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-Jason (8/23/07-Present) 1995 Subaru SVX LSi (197k) Polo Green (#1102) 03/95 Mods: DDM Tuning 4500k 35w Low Beam HID, 100w H3 Bulbs, Extra Ground Cables, 15 minute $12.96 mod, svxfiles designed transmission mount (), sporting a "new" tail light bar, silver BBS rims, custom power steering cooler (one that doesn't dump ATF constantly), new negative lead cable, no more third or fourth gear (1977-Present) 1977 Chevrolet Corvette (81k) Silver (12/01/2011-Present) 2005 Subaru Outback 2.5i Limited 5MT (97k) I have a bad feeling about this. -Obi Wan Kenobi |
#182
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Makes You Wonder!!!
What the 9/11 Commission narrative left out: Iraqis.
AHMED HIKMAT SHAKIR IS A shadowy figure who provided logistical assistance to one, maybe two, of the 9/11 hijackers. Years before, he had received a phone call from the Jersey City, New Jersey, safehouse of the plotters who would soon, in February 1993, park a truck bomb in the basement of the World Trade Center. The safehouse was the apartment of Musab Yasin, brother of Abdul Rahman Yasin, who scorched his own leg while mixing the chemicals for the 1993 bomb. When Shakir was arrested shortly after the 9/11 attacks, his "pocket litter," in the parlance of the investigators, included contact information for Musab Yasin and another 1993 plotter, a Kuwaiti native named Ibrahim Suleiman. These facts alone, linking the 1993 and 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, would seem to cry out for additional scrutiny, no? The Yasin brothers and Shakir have more in common. They are all Iraqis. And two of them--Abdul Rahman Yasin and Shakir--went free, despite their participation in attacks on the World Trade Center, at least partly because of efforts made on their behalf by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Both men returned to Iraq--Yasin fled there in 1993 with the active assistance of the Iraqi government. For ten years in Iraq, Abdul Rahman Yasin was provided safe haven and financing by the regime, support that ended only with the coalition intervention in March 2003. ... Those three individuals are nowhere mentioned in the 428 pages that comprise the body of the 9/11 Commission report. ... Why? Why would the 9/11 Commission fail to mention Abdul Rahman Yasin, who admitted his role in the first World Trade Center attack, which killed 6 people, injured more than 1,000, and blew a hole seven stories deep in the North Tower? It's an odd omission, especially since the commission named no fewer than five of his accomplices. Why would the 9/11 Commission neglect Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, a man who was photographed assisting a 9/11 hijacker and attended perhaps the most important 9/11 planning meeting? And why would the 9/11 Commission fail to mention the overlap between the two successful plots to attack the World Trade Center? The answer is simple: The Iraqi link didn't fit the commission's narrative. ... ...the 9/11 Commission's deliberate exclusion of the Iraqis from its analysis is indefensible. ... Shakir, the Iraqi-born facilitator, would be arrested six days after the September 11 attacks by authorities in Doha, Qatar. According to an October 7, 2002, article by Newsweek's Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, "A search of Shakir's apartment in Doha, the country's capital, yielded a treasure trove, including telephone records linking him to suspects in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and Project Bojinka, a 1994 Manila plot to blow up civilian airliners over the Pacific Ocean." ... On October 21, 2001, Shakir flew to Amman, Jordan, where he hoped to board a plane to Baghdad. But authorities in Jordan arrested him for questioning. Shakir was held in a Jordanian prison for three months without being charged, prompting Amnesty International to write the Jordanian government seeking an explanation. The CIA questioned Shakir and concluded that he had received training in counter-interrogation techniques. Shortly after Shakir was detained, Saddam's government began to pressure Jordanian intelligence--with a mixture of diplomatic overtures and threats--to release Shakir. They got their wish on January 28, 2002. He is believed to have returned promptly to Baghdad. ... ...the Senate Select Intelligence Committee released its own evaluation of the intelligence on Iraq: The first connection to the [9/11] attack involved Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national, who facilitated the travel of one of the September 11 hijackers to Malaysia in January 2000. [Redacted.] A foreign government service reported that Shakir worked for four months as an airport facilitator in Kuala Lumpur at the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000. Shakir claimed he got this job through Ra'ad al-Mudaris, an Iraqi Embassy employee. [Redacted.] Another source claimed that al-Mudaris was a former IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Service] officer. The CIA judged in "Iraqi Support for Terrorism," however, that al-Mudaris' [redacted] that the circumstances surrounding the hiring of Shakir for this position did not suggest it was done on behalf of the IIS. A note about that last sentence: The Senate committee report is a devastating indictment of the CIA's woefully inadequate collection of intelligence on Iraq, and its equally flawed analysis. One, Shakir himself told interrogators that an Iraqi embassy employee got him the job that allowed him to help the hijacker(s). Two, that Iraqi embassy employee was Ra'ad al Mudaris. Three, another source identified al Mudaris as former Iraqi Intelligence. So how is it that the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report contains a substantive account of Shakir's mysterious contribution to the 9/11 plot, while the 9/11 Commission report--again, released two weeks later--simply ignores it? Lee
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SVXx2 92 SVX LS-L Silver 92 SVX LS-L Burgundy (structurally challenged with 2792 miles) 96 SVX LSi Red 92 SVX LS Pearl (Parts) 01 F150 4X4 Red (+6 with other members of the family) FREEDOM IS NOT FREE |
#183
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Well the Middle east borders are fluid in my opinion, its a radical terrorist that i have a problem with not an individual country
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1992 SVX LSL Ex wifey has it now pending self destruction 2001 Legacy mods to come 1992 Subaru Legacy 2.2 214k Boob wheels CANT KILL IT |
#184
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Lee What Is Your Source?
And what is the relevance? Please explicate. It's interesting and I'd like to follow up with some of my own research.
WGJ |
#185
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More Conclusions...
BIOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
(U) Conclusion 48. The assessment in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that, "[W]e judge that all key aspects - research & development, production, and weaponization - of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee. (U) Conclusion 49. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that "Baghdad has biological weapons" overstated what was known about Iraq's biological weapons holdings. The NIE did not explain the uncertainties underlying this statement. (U) Conclusion 50. The statement in the National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad has mobile transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological weapons agents," overstated what the intelligence reporting suggested about an Iraqi mobile biological weapons effort and did not accurately convey to readers the uncertainties behind the source reporting. (**) Conclusion 51. The Central Intelligence Agency withheld important information concerning both CURVE BALL's reliability and DELETEDreporting from many Intelligence Community analysts with a need to know the information. (**)Conclusion 52. The Defense Human Intelligence Service, which had primary responsibility for handling the Intelligence Community's interaction with CURVE BALL's DELETED debriefers, demonstrated serious lapses in handling such an important source. (U) Conclusion 53. The statement in the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate that "[C]hances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee. (U) Conclusion 54. The assessments in the National Intelligence Estimate concerning Iraq's capability to produce and weaponize biological weapons agents are, for the most part, supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee, but the NIE did not explain that the research discussed could have been very limited in nature, been abandoned years ago, or represented legitimate activity. (U) Conclusion 55. The National Intelligence Estimate misrepresented the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) 1999 assessment concerning Iraq's biological research capability. (U) Conclusion 56. The statement in the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered biological weapons agents," overstated both the intelligence reporting and analysts assessments of Iraq's development of genetically engineered biological agents. (U) Conclusion 57. The assessment in the National Intelligence Estimate that "Iraq has . . . dry biological weapons (BW) agents in its arsenal" is not supported by the intelligence information provided to the Committee. CHEMICAL CONCLUSIONS (U) Conclusion 58. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad has . . . chemical weapons" overstated both what was known about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings. (U) Conclusion 59. The judgment in the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production overstated both what was known about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry and what intelligence analysts judged about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry. (**) Conclusion 60. It was not clearly explained in the National Intelligence Estimate that the basis for several of the Intelligence Community's assessments about Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities and activities were not based directly on intelligence reporting of those capabilities and activities, but were based on layers of analysis regarding DELETED intelligence reporting. (U) Conclusion 61. The Intelligence Community's assessment that "Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapons agents -- much of it added in the last year," was an analytical judgment and not based on intelligence reporting that indicated the existence of an Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile of this size. (U) Conclusion 62. The Intelligence Community's assessment that Iraq had experience in manufacturing chemical weapons bombs, artillery rockets and projectiles was reasonable based on intelligence derived from Iraqi declarations. (U) Conclusion 63. The National Intelligence Estimate assessment that "Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited chemical weapons production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry" was not substantiated by the intelligence provided to the Committee. (U) Conclusion 64. The National Intelligence Estimate accurately represented information known about Iraq's procurement of defensive equipment. WGJ |
#186
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The One Percent Doctrine...
Here's some excerpts from Suskind's book, The One Percent Doctrine:
Within the government, he goes on, there was frequent frustration with the White House's hermetic decision-making style. “Voicing desire for a more traditional, transparent policy process,” he writes, “prompted accusations of disloyalty,” and “issues argued, often vociferously, at the level of deputies and principals rarely seemed to go upstream in their fullest form to the president's desk, and if they did, it was often after Bush seemed to have already made up his mind based on what was so often cited as his 'instinct' or 'gut.'” This book augments the portrait of Bush as an incurious and curiously uninformed executive that Suskind earlier set out in “The Price of Loyalty” and in a series of magazine articles on the president and key aides. In “The One Percent Doctrine,” he writes that Cheney's nickname inside the CIA was Edgar (as in Edgar Bergen), casting Bush in the puppet role of Charlie McCarthy, and cites one instance after another in which the president was not fully briefed (or had failed to read the basic paperwork) about a crucial situation. During a November 2001 session with the president, Suskind recounts, a CIA briefer realized that the Pentagon had not told Bush of the CIA's urgent concern that Osama bin Laden might escape from the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan (as he indeed later did) if U.S. reinforcements were not promptly sent in. And several months later, he says, attendees at a meeting between Bush and the Saudis discovered after the fact that an important packet laying out the Saudis' views about the Israeli-Palestinian situation had been diverted to the vice president's office and never reached the president. Keeping information away from the president, Suskind argues, was a calculated White House strategy that gave Bush “plausible deniability” from Cheney's point of view, and that perfectly meshed with the commander in chief's own impatience with policy details. Suggesting that Bush deliberately did not read the full National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which was delivered to the White House in the fall of 2002, Suskind writes: “Keeping certain knowledge from Bush – much of it shrouded, as well, by classification – meant that the president, whose each word circles the globe, could advance various strategies by saying whatever was needed. He could essentially be 'deniable' about his own statements.” “Whether Cheney's innovations were tailored to match Bush's inclinations, or vice versa, is almost immaterial,” Suskind continues. “It was a firm fit. Under this strategic model, reading the entire NIE would be problematic for Bush: it could hem in the president's rhetoric, a key weapon in the march to war. He would know too much.” As for Tenet, this book provides a nuanced portrait of a man with “colliding loyalties – to the president, who could have fired him after 9/11 but didn't; and to his analysts, whom he was institutionally and emotionally committed to defend.” It would become an increasingly untenable position, as the White House grew more and more impatient with the CIA's reluctance to supply readily the sort of intelligence it wanted. (A Pentagon unit headed by Douglas Feith was set up as an alternative to the CIA, to provide, in Suskind's words, “intelligence on demand” to both Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and the office of the vice president.) WGJ |
#187
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More One Percent...
At the same time, Suskind suggests that Tenet acted as
a kind of White House enabler. He writes that in the wake of 9/11, Tenet felt a “mix of insecurity and gratitude” vis-a-vis George W. Bush, and that, eager to please his boss, he repeatedly pushed CIA staff members to come up with evidence that might support the president's public statements. In the days after 9/11 Bush defended the embattled CIA chief to angry congressmen, and at that point, Suskind writes: “George Tenet would do anything his president asked. Anything. And George W. Bush knew it.” WGJ I'll post my theory of what I think happened shortly. |
#188
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Thanks--More Support!
Quote:
Also, remember that Tenet was a Clinton Appointee and just left in charge by Bush. Contrary to what you have posted--Tenet did not necessarily have great loyalties to Bush. I do agree that Bush SHOULD have fired him, but you are just supporting my agruments. Just check out Suskind's motivations and political beliefs. His book is pure speculation with no real basis for fact. Thanks for doing the research that has cleared Bush. Lee
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SVXx2 92 SVX LS-L Silver 92 SVX LS-L Burgundy (structurally challenged with 2792 miles) 96 SVX LSi Red 92 SVX LS Pearl (Parts) 01 F150 4X4 Red (+6 with other members of the family) FREEDOM IS NOT FREE |
#189
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Quote:
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-Steve Member #895(the member formerly known as BurgundyBeast) 01' MSM Lexus IS300 |
#190
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You Read Again!!
Quote:
Maybe I should quote Ann Coulter or Rush to prove that he DID NOT lie. That would be the same type of proof. Get real. Lee
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SVXx2 92 SVX LS-L Silver 92 SVX LS-L Burgundy (structurally challenged with 2792 miles) 96 SVX LSi Red 92 SVX LS Pearl (Parts) 01 F150 4X4 Red (+6 with other members of the family) FREEDOM IS NOT FREE |
#191
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Quote:
Let's say I'm looking at your house, and I see 2 women walk out. So now I think that you are running a illegal brothel out of your attic. At this point I don't have any proof, but I'm going to tell people that you are. Someone might show up to take a look at your attic, but you probably won't want them to go snooping around your house because you've done nothing wrong. People will think you're acting suspicious, so then others will look for evidence to support my claims (maybe they'll take a picture of your wife coming out of the front door, or perhaps a man walking in the front door, they might even say that the truck you have parked in your driveway is actually a prositute transport device). Eventually the police get a warrant, come in, search your attic, and find nothing (atleast I think they'll find nothing ). Did I, or did I not, lie? Please note, I'm not trying to provide credit to his source, nor do I require that you provide a far right Bush lover counterclaim in which a far right Bush lover says he didn't lie. I'm just encouraging you to look past your own political beliefs before you attack those of others
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-Steve Member #895(the member formerly known as BurgundyBeast) 01' MSM Lexus IS300 |
#192
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Again
There is no evidence to prove that he lied. I don't need to come up with anything to prove that he was telling the truth.
It is interesting to note again---IF he did supposedly lie then every major figure in BOTH political parties also lied as they said essentially the same thing based on the same intelligence. Lee
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SVXx2 92 SVX LS-L Silver 92 SVX LS-L Burgundy (structurally challenged with 2792 miles) 96 SVX LSi Red 92 SVX LS Pearl (Parts) 01 F150 4X4 Red (+6 with other members of the family) FREEDOM IS NOT FREE |
#193
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Quote:
I like this analogy.
__________________
Robert Is Bush in jail yet? (Looks frantically at watch, then back up) How about now? Now? Come onnnnnn...... Someone freeze me until January, this wait is killing me. Update: 09 January, and still not in jail! Wassup?? 1992 Teal LS-L - 160k (Now new and improved with perfect paint!) |
#194
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Suskind Credibility
Like I said the official bipartisan investigations have faulted the intelligence commnunity and have not even hinted that Bush lied.
As to friend Suskind---he has limited credibility, but strong motivation for pushing his agenda. Here is just one example: "June 18, 2006 ‘The One Percent Doctrine’: Why I’m skeptical of any report by Ron Suskind Two years ago, Ron Suskind deceitfully pushed the idea that the Pentagon had a 2001 map showing how the allies would divvy up Iraqi oil fields after Saddam Hussein was ousted. So excuse me if I doubt everything in his new book, "The One Percent Doctrine." The book claims al-Qaida in 2003 planned a cyanide attack on the New York City subway, but with 45 days to go, Osama bin Laden’s deputy inexplicably called off the mission. Yeah. Right. Suskind says he has all sorts of credible sources who make this new mystery story so compelling that we must buy his book. Yeah. Right. The crafty author. Why am I so dubious? Go back two and a half years, when Suskind himself was the primary source for a news story. For the Jan. 14, 2004, edition of CBS’s "60 Minutes," Suskind was crafty enough give Leslie Stahl a few facts here and a few facts there, and then throw in a stray Iraq oil-field map as "evidence" of the most diabolical conspiracy imaginable in the Iraq war: "Blood for Oil." Stahl led into the Iraq map story by saying: "Based on his interviews with O’Neill and several other officials at the [National Security Council] meetings, Suskind writes that the planning envisioned peace-keeping troops, war crimes tribunals, and even divvying up Iraq’s oil wells." What intentions. The "60 Minutes" camera showed us the document with the map, as Stahl narrated, "Suskind obtained this Pentagon document dated March 5, 2001, entitled ‘Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oil Field Contracts.’ It includes a map of potential areas for exploration." SUSKIND:"It talks about contractors around the world from, you know, 30, 40 countries, and which ones have what intentions or..." STAHL: "On oil." SUSKIND: "On oil in Iraq." Smoking gun? The story left viewers with the clear impression that the map was the smoking gun of the anti-Iraq-liberation movement. This map of carved-up oil fields appeared to be undeniable evidence that the Iraq invasion was not ordered to end repression, to establish democracy, to punish Saddam’s support for terrorists or to penalize Saddam’s failure to cooperate fully with U.N. arms inspectors hunting WMD stockpiles. That story shook my faith in the liberation of Iraq. My God, here was the map of Iraq, and here were lines drawn showing Iraq’s divided up oil fields. It seemed the Pentagon had sacrificed lives principally, maybe only, for oil! Defense officials apparently were even showing friendly nations which oil fields they would control as the spoils of war. But then, listening to NPR three days later, I heard the truth. Terry Gross of NPR’s "Fresh Air" revealed the "60 Minutes" blockbuster as a hoax. ‘What was this document?’ Gross accidentally asked enough questions of Suskind to expose the deception. That day, Gross interviewed both Suskind and former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, about whom Suskind had just written another book, "The Price of Loyalty." Suskind obtained a copy of the Iraq oil-field map for that book. Gross had seen the "60 Minutes" show, so naturally she asked about the Iraqi oil-field map. GROSS: "One of the documents that you have is a Pentagon document that’s headlined: ‘Foreign Suitors for Iraq Oil Field Contracts,’ March 5th, 2001. And there’s a map of areas for exploration. What was this document? What was in it? I’m wondering if you think this document has any implications for the American public..." SUSKIND: "Terry, I can..." GROSS: "Yeah." SUSKIND: "...respond to that. That’s actually—‘60 Minutes’ miscast it as a Pentagon document. In the book it’s clear it’s not that. It’s a Commerce Department document that was circulated, you know, in various parts of the U.S. government, including to the Cheney energy task force, that came through to land on Paul’s desk. And what it is, it’s a study of foreign suitors who are interested or have experience in terms of oil in Iraq. That’s what it’s about." Notice, Suskind still said nothing to counter the "60 Minutes" insinuation that the map was a plan for dividing up oil in post-war Iraq. Then Paul O’Neill jumped in, and seemed to argue with Suskind in a curious, but revealing way. O’NEILL: "Terry, this is a guess on my part, but I believe that this document had its roots in the Clinton administration. There was no way that a new administration could create this kind of document in the short period of time before this meeting." SUSKIND: "Well, but to be fair, let’s make sure we’re clear here. This is a document that’s dated March 1 or 2 [2001]. So there probably was enough time, just based on the dating of the document. But..." O’NEILL: "Knowing how government works, I’ve got to tell you, I don’t believe it was done in six weeks. I just don’t believe that." So, by the time Terry Gross was done interviewing Suskind and O’Neill, it was pretty clear that the innocuous Iraq oil-field map not only was unrelated to Bush’s Pentagon, it probably was unrelated to Bush entirely. It also was clear that Suskind was pointing the "facts" in one direction, and O’Neill in another. To his credit, O’Neill seemed to be the one pointing to the truth. Map was not a plan. As it turns out, the Iraq map did not show how the oil fields would be divided up after an Iraq invasion. It was a map showing what actually was happening in Saddam’s Iraq in late 2000 or early 2001. It showed how Saddam had divided up Iraq’s oil among foreign companies for his own profit. (Of the 30 nations mentioned on the map, the U.S. is not one. Of the 63 oil-related companies listed, not one is a U.S. company. Why? Because these were the companies Saddam had contracts with in 2000.) But Suskind didn’t want us to know the truth. With 1 percent "facts" and 99 percent dishonest sensationalism, Suskind was trying to sell a book. That’s "The One Percent Doctrine" in publishing circles. Unless I missed it, neither CBS nor Suskind has ever apologized for the outrageously false allegations made in the Jan. 14, 2004, "60 Minutes" show. Fool me once. That was a monumental case of presenting fiction as fact. Even when confronted by Gross and corrected by O’Neill, Suskind kept pushing the false impression. So no, I can’t ever take anything Suskind says seriously." Frank Warner And other thoughts on the Book: "The One Percent Doctrine," a new book by Ron Suskind on the shadowy war on terror, is getting good reviews in the liberal press, which likes its portrayal of the administration as a bunch of bunglers. And conservatives like the parts that show Vice President Dick Cheney and other top Bush administration officials as committed to ruthlessly destroying al Qaeda. But some in the intelligence community contend the book, which has reached No. 1 on Amazon.com, is riddled with errors. "A lot of information is simply wrong," said a counterterrorism official who asked not to be named. One glaring inaccuracy, this official said, is the book's assertion that Abu Zubaydah, whom the CIA captured in Pakistan in 2002, was not a key al Qaeda figure, and was insane to boot. The counterterror official said Zubaydah is "crazy like a fox" and was a senior planner inside al Qaeda who has provided critical information on how Osama bin Laden's group works. " 'One Percent Doctrine' is an appropriate title for the book because it appears about 1 percent of the material in the book is right," the official said. The book attempts to delve behind the scenes to show how the Bush team is waging a shadowy war against al Qaeda, with successes and failures. The September 11 commission report said Zubaydah was a key terrorist recruiter for bin Laden and ran his own al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. The CIA is holding him at an undisclosed site. It is also interesting to note that counterterrorism efforts in Somali were not even mentioned. They were on going for more than 3 years prior to publication of the book. Information is reported erroneously and cherry picked to support his liberal backing agenda." Lee
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SVXx2 92 SVX LS-L Silver 92 SVX LS-L Burgundy (structurally challenged with 2792 miles) 96 SVX LSi Red 92 SVX LS Pearl (Parts) 01 F150 4X4 Red (+6 with other members of the family) FREEDOM IS NOT FREE |
#195
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Quote:
If anyone is wondering who O'Neil is, he is the one that was making a deal with Dubai that started the port scandal. He was the previous owner of the company sold to Dubai that caused the whole uproar in the first place. Insider trading on a government level. Once the citizens got hold of the info and went berzerk, he no longer needed the position for his dasterdly deeds and he resigned. So the whole story is discredited. O'Neill is the biggest crook of them all and was trying to sell our national security. He isn't worth a gallon of piss oil, and his opinion is worth less. And did anyone notice the slip on Cheney? Quote: It’s a Commerce Department document that was circulated, you know, in various parts of the U.S. government, including to the Cheney energy task force, that came through to land on Paul’s desk. UnQuote: What the heck is Mr. Halliburton Cheney doing with an "energy task force"? That smells like dog puke in every way you could possibly approach it. Serious conflict of interest here. Man.... when the democrats gain the house, and this all breaks lose, it's going to make Watergate look like the simple break in that it was. Stand by. It's coming.
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Robert Is Bush in jail yet? (Looks frantically at watch, then back up) How about now? Now? Come onnnnnn...... Someone freeze me until January, this wait is killing me. Update: 09 January, and still not in jail! Wassup?? 1992 Teal LS-L - 160k (Now new and improved with perfect paint!) |
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